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Fuehrer Headquarters
23 March 1942
Top Secret
The Fuehrer
and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces
25 Copies
Copy No. ...
OKW/WFSt/Op.Nr.: 001042 g.Kdos.
Directive No. 40
Subj: Command Organization of the Coasts
1. General Situation:
In the days to
come the coasts of Europe will be seriously exposed to the danger of
enemy landings.
The enemy's
choice of time and place for landing operations will not be based
solely on strategic considerations. Reverses in other theaters of
operations, obligations toward his allies, and political motives may
prompt the enemy to arrive at decisions that would be unlikely to
result from purely military deliberations.
Even enemy
landing operations with limited objectives will--insofar as the enemy
does establish himself on the coast at all--seriously affect our own
plans in any case. They will disrupt our coastwise shipping and tie
down strong Army and Luftwaffe forces which thereby would become
unavailable for commitment at critical points. Particularly grave
dangers will arise if the enemy succeeds in taking our airfields, or in
establishing airbases in the territory that he has captured.
Moreover, our
military installations and war industries that are in many instances
located along or close to the coast, and which in part have valuable
equipment, invite local raids by the enemy.
Special
attention must be paid to British preparations for landings on the open
coast, for which numerous armored landing craft suitable for the
transportation of combat vehicles and heavy weapons are available.
Large-scale parachute and glider operations are likewise to be
expected.
2. General Tactical Instructions for Coastal Defense:
1. Coastal defense is
a task for the Armed Forces, and requires particularly close and
complete co-operation of all the services.
2. Timely recognition
of the preparations, assembly, and approach of the enemy for a landing
operation must be the goal of the intelligence service as well as that
of continual reconnaissance by Navy and Luftwaffe.
Embarkation operations or transport fleets at sea must subsequently be
the target for the concentration of all suitable air and naval forces,
with the object of destroying the enemy as far off our coast as
possible.
However, because the enemy may employ skillful deception and take
advantage of poor visibility, thereby catching us completely by
surprise, all troops that might be exposed to such surprise operations
must always be fully prepared for defensive action.
Counteracting the well-known tendency of the troops to relax their
alertness as time goes on will be one of the most important command
functions.
3. Recent battle
experiences have taught us that in fighting for the beaches--which
include coastal waters within the range of medium coastal
artillery--responsibility for the preparation and execution of
defensive operations must unequivocally and unreservedly be
concentrated in the hands of one man.
All available forces and equipment of the several services, the
organizations and formations outside of the armed forces, as well as
the German civil agencies in the zone of operations will be committed
by the responsible commander for the destruction of enemy transport
facilities and invasion forces. That commitment must lead to the
collapse of the enemy attack before, if possible, but at the latest
upon the actual landing.
An immediate counterattack must annihilate landed enemy forces, or
throw them back into the sea, All instruments of warfare--regardless of
the service, or the formation outside of the armed forces to which they
might belong--are to be jointly committed toward that end.
Nevertheless, shore-based Navy supply establishments must not be
hampered in their essential functions, nor Luftwaffe ground
organizations and Flak protection of airfields impaired in their
efficiency, unless they have become directly affected by ground combat
operations.
No headquarters and no unit may initiate a retrograde movement in such
a situation. Wherever Germans are committed on or near the coast, they
must be armed and trained for active combat.
The enemy must be kept from establishing himself on any island which in
enemy hands would constitute a threat to the mainland or coastwise
shipping.
4. Disposition of
forces and improvement of fortifications are to be so made that the
main defensive effort lies in those coastal sectors that are the most
probable sites for enemy landings (fortified areas).
Those remaining coastal sectors that are vulnerable to coups de main of
even small units must be protected by means of a strongpoint type of
defense, utilizing, if possible, the support of shore batteries. All
installations of military and military-economic importance will be
included in that strongpoint defense system.
The same rules apply to offshore islands. Coastal sectors that are less
endangered will be patrolled.
5. The several
services will establish a uniform definition of coastal sectors, if
necessary on the basis of a final decision on the part of the
responsible commander named in III.) 1.) below.
6. By means of
proportionate allocation of forces, improvement of positions (perimeter
defense), and stockpiling of supplies, the fortified areas and
strongpoints must be enabled to hold out even against superior enemy
forces for extended periods of time.
Fortified areas and strongpoints are to be held to the last. They must
never be forced to surrender because of a shortage of ammunition,
rations, or water.
7. The commander
responsible according to III.) 1.) below, issues orders for coastal
security, and assures a speedy evaluation, collation, and dissemination
to authorized headquarters and civil agencies of intelligence procured
by all the services.
Upon the first indication of an imminent enemy operation, that
commander is authorized to issue the necessary orders for unified and
complementary reconnaissance by sea and air.
8. All elements
stationed in the vicinity of the coast, whether headquarters or units
of the Armed Forces, or organizations or formations outside of the
Armed Forces, will forego the niceties of peacetime protocol. Their
quarters, security measures, equipment, state of alert, and utilization
of local resources will be governed solely by the necessity of
countering every enemy raid with the utmost speed and force. Wherever
the military situation demands, the civilian population will be
evacuated at once.
3. Command:
1. The following
authorities are responsible for the preparation and conduct of defense
on coasts under German control:
1. in the Eastern Theater of Operations (excluding Finland), the army
commanders designated by OKH;
2. in the coastal sector under the control of Army Lapland, the
Commanding General of Army Lapland;
3. in Norway, the Armed Forces Commander, Norway;
4. in Denmark, the Commander of German Troops in Denmark;
5. in the occupied West (including the Netherlands), the Commander in
Chief West;
In matters pertaining to coastal defense, the commanders mentioned in
categories d) and e) above are under the direct control of OKW.
6. in the Balkans (including the occupied islands), the Armed Forces
Commander Southeast;
7. in the Baltic and the Ukraine, the Armed Forces Commanders Baltic
and Ukraine;
8. in the Zone of Interior, the commanding admirals.
2. Within the
framework of coastal defense missions, the commanders designated in
III.) 1.) above, will have command authority over tactical headquarters
of the services, the German civil authorities as well as units and
organizations outside of the armed forces that are located within their
respective areas. In exercising that authority, the commanders will
issue tactical, organizational, and supply orders necessary for coastal
defense, and insure their execution. They will influence training to
whatever extent is necessary for preparing their forces for ground
operations. The required data will be put at their disposal.
3. Orders and measures
implementing this directive will give priority to the following:
1. inclusion within fortified areas or strongpoints of all
installations important militarily or to the war economy, particularly
those of the Navy (submarine bases) and the Luftwaffe;
2. unified direction of coastal surveillance;
3. infantry defenses of fortified areas and strongpoints;
4. infantry defenses of isolated installations outside of fortified
areas and strongpoints, such as coastal patrol and aircraft warning
stations;
5. artillery defenses against ground targets (in installing new shore
batteries and displacing those in position, the requirements of naval
warfare will receive priority);
6. defense preparedness of fortified establishments, their structural
improvement, and the stockpiling of reserve supplies, as well as
defensive preparedness and stockpiling of supplies in isolated
installations outside of those establishments (including supply with
all weapons necessary for defense, mines, hand grenades, flame
throwers, obstacle material, and similar items);
7. signal communications;
8. tests of the state of alert as well as infantry and artillery
training within the framework of the defensive missions.
4. Similar authority
will be vested in the commanders of local headquarters down to sector
commands, insofar as they have been made responsible for the defense of
coastal sectors.
The commanders enumerated in III.) 1.) above, will generally confer
such responsibilities on commanding generals of army divisions that are
committed for coastal defense, and in Crete, on the Fortress Commander
Crete.
In individual sectors and subsectors, and particularly in
establishments that have definitely been designated as air or naval
bases, the local Luftwaffe or Navy commanders are to be put in charge
of the entire defense, insofar as their other missions permit them to
assume those responsibilities.
5. Naval and strategic
air forces are subject to the control of the Navy or Luftwaffe,
respectively. However, in case of enemy attacks on the coast they
are-within the framework of their tactical capabilities-bound to comply
with requests from the commanders responsible for defensive operations.
For that reason they must be included in the exchange of military
intelligence, in preparation for their future employment. Close contact
must be maintained with their respective higher headquarters.
4. Special missions of the several services within the framework of coastal defense:
1. Navy:
1. organization and protection of coastwise shipping;
2. training and commitment of the entire coastal artillery against sea
targets;
3. commitment of naval forces.
2. Luftwaffe:
1. air defense in the coastal areas.
This mission does not affect the right of local defense commanders to
direct the assembly of Flak artillery suited and available for
commitment against enemy invasion forces.
2. improvement of the Luftwaffe ground organization and its protection
against air and surprise ground attacks on airfields that have not been
sufficiently protected by their inclusion in the coastal defense
system.
3. commitment of strategic air forces.
Instances of overlapping control resulting from those special missions
must be accepted as unavoidable.
5. As of 1 April 1942, all instructions and orders not in agreement with the present directive are rescinded.
New combat
directives issued by the responsible commander pursuant to my directive
will be submitted to me through OKW.
signed: Adolf Hitler
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